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THE DANGERS OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION: A CALL FOR GREATER 
STATE INVOLVEMENT TO ENSURE 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
Dana Walsh* 
Abstract: In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Perry v. New Hamp-
shire, the Court’s first case on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications 
in thirty-five years. The Court held that the Due Process Clause does not 
require a preliminary judicial assessment of the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification that was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive cir-
cumstances orchestrated by law enforcement. The Court retained factors 
for assessing reliability when police misconduct is involved that were 
adopted in the 1970s, despite the emergence of new data highlighting the 
inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification. This Note argues that 
the Supreme Court did not go far enough in Perry to ensure fundamental 
fairness, and that state courts should interpret their own constitutions to 
provide greater protections for defendants. New Jersey adopted a com-
prehensive model in 2011 that more adequately accounts for the unreli-
ability of eyewitness identification. Other states should follow New Jersey’s 
lead and adopt a similar approach. 
Introduction 
 In 1985, a prosecutor posed the question, “Jennifer, are you abso-
lutely sure that Ronald Junior Cotton is the man?”1 Jennifer Thomp-
son, a rape victim, answered yes with confidence.2 Because of this iden-
tification, Ronald Cotton spent more than ten years in prison for a 
crime that he did not commit.3 Jennifer Thompson identified a man 
who she believed was her rapist.4 She identified Mr. Cotton in a photo 
 
* Dana Walsh is an Articles Editor for the Boston College Law Review. 
1 Jennifer Thompson-Cannino, Ronald Cotton & Erin Torneo, Picking Cotton: 
Our Memoir of Injustice and Redemption 64 (2009). 
2 See id. 
3 Id. at 284. 
4 Id. at 64. Jennifer Thompson described her experience working with a sketch artist, 
trying to recall the shape of her rapist’s brows, his eyes, and his smile, which were “seared 
in [her] memory.” Id. at 23. 
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array, a lineup, and at trial; she was mistaken all three times.5 Later, 
when she saw her actual rapist sitting in a courtroom, she did not rec-
ognize him.6 The judge presiding over Mr. Cotton’s trial followed pro-
cedures that the Supreme Court has outlined to evaluate the reliability 
of eyewitness identification testimony and its admissibility.7 
 Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton’s story is not unique.8 
Eyewitness misidentifications plague the American criminal justice sys-
tem.9 In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Perry v. New Hampshire, 
its first case on eyewitness identification since 1977, and held that the 
Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial assessment 
of the reliability of an identification unless the identification was pro-
cured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances orchestrated by law 
enforcement.10 Since the Court decided United States v. Wade in 1967, 
the scientific community has thoroughly researched the reliability of 
eyewitness identification and highlighted the dangers of misidentifica-
tion.11 A number of studies indicate that eyewitness identifications are 
often unreliable.12 Experts have called for police and judicial reform to 
counter the frailties inherent in eyewitness identification and ensure 
fairness at criminal proceedings.13 Under the Due Process Clause of 
                                                                                                                      
 
5 See David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convictions: 
Let’s Give Science a Chance, 89 Or. L. Rev. 263, 264 (2010) (describing how Ms. Thompson 
claimed to be absolutely certain that Mr. Cotton was her attacker during each identifica-
tion). 
6 See Thompson-Cannino, Cotton & Torneo, supra note 1, at 134. 
7 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (articulating the due process stan-
dard for challenging eyewitness identifications); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–
37 (1967) (holding that there is a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present during 
a post-indictment, pretrial lineup); infra notes 90–147 and accompanying text. 
8 See Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent 45, 50, 55, 56, 58 (2011) (re-
counting cases of convictions that were based upon eyewitness misidentifications). 
9 Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, Innocence Project, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited May 8, 
2013) (discussing the Innocence Project’s ongoing work to raise awareness about the dangers 
of eyewitness identification and to overturn erroneous convictions). 
10 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012). 
11 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 233–35 (describing some of the dangers of eyewitness identifi-
cation); Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and 
Criminal 10–11 (1997); infra notes 48–89 and accompanying text. 
12 See Charles A. Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification Is Significantly Associ-
ated with Performance on a Standardized Test of Face Recognition, 30 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 
213, 220–23 (2007); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological 
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 765, 765–66 (1995). 
13 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 80–83 (calling for reforms to eyewitness identification 
procedures); Gary L. Wells, Perry vs. New Hampshire: Reflections on Oral Arguments of Nov. 
2, 2011, at 3 (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/Wells_articles_ 
pdf/Perry_vs_New_Hampshire_-_Gary_Wells.pdf (expressing hope that the Supreme Court 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants have a right to a fundamen-
tally fair proceeding.14 Unreliable eyewitness identifications undermine 
this judicial safeguard.15 
                                                                                                                     
 This Note argues that to ensure fundamental fairness and to pro-
tect a defendant’s due process rights, additional safeguards must be 
implemented regarding the admissibility of eyewitness identifications.16 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Perry eliminated due process claims 
when the police do not suggestively orchestrate an identification pro-
cedure.17 Moreover, the Court failed to confront the scientific data 
highlighting the unreliability of eyewitness identification.18 In light of 
Perry and the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to revisit its eyewitness 
identification jurisprudence, this Note argues that states should grant 
greater protections under their own constitutions to exclude unreliable 
identifications.19 The New Jersey Supreme Court did this in 2011, and 
other state courts should adopt New Jersey’s approach.20 
 Part I of this Note outlines the concept of fundamental fairness 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
its impact on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, scientific 
research on eyewitness identification, and past and current trends in 
state and federal eyewitness identification jurisprudence.21 Part II ana-
lyzes the relationship between scientific data, reliability, and eyewitness 
identification, and identifies two problems with the Supreme Court’s 
 
would not wait another thirty-four years to confront the problems of eyewitness identifica-
tion). 
14 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 158 (2009); infra 
notes 30–47 and accompanying text. 
15 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735, 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (advocating for additional 
safeguards to prevent the admission of unreliable identifications); Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 
(1987). 
16 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113; Wade, 388 U.S. at 235; State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 
919 (N.J. 2011); infra notes 266–333 and accompanying text. 
17 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
18 See id. 
19 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919; State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 592 (Wis. 2005); see 
also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. 
L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977) (calling on states to grant greater individual protections when the 
federal Constitution and the Supreme Court fall short); infra notes 266–295 and accom-
panying text. 
20 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919; see also Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 209–
10 (Mass. 2011) (demonstrating the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s willingness to 
revisit its eyewitness identification jurisprudence); infra notes 296–333 and accompanying 
text. 
21 See infra notes 25–174 and accompanying text. 
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approach in Perry.22 Part III then argues that in light of Perry, state 
courts should interpret their constitutions more liberally than the Four-
teenth Amendment to exclude unreliable identifications and imple-
ment a test that takes science into account.23 Part III calls for states to 
adopt the New Jersey Supreme Court’s approach, articulated in Hender-
son, as the best way to ensure fundamental fairness at trial.24 
I. The Constitution and Eyewitness Identification 
 This Part discusses the history surrounding the constitutionality of 
eyewitness identification testimony.25 Section A describes the concept of 
fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.26 Section B describes scientific studies conducted 
since 1977 that emphasize the unreliability of eyewitness identification 
through exoneration data and psychological research.27 Section C dis-
cusses U.S. Supreme Court case law regarding eyewitness identification, 
beginning with the Wade trilogy of cases decided in 1967 and conclud-
ing with its decision in Perry.28 Finally, Section D outlines the ap-
proaches that some state courts have adopted for eyewitness identifica-
tion.29 
less interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include a right to fun-
                                                                                                                     
A. Due Process and Fundamental Fairness 
 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution requires fundamental fairness in criminal and civil pro-
ceedings.30 This protection extends to criminal trials involving eyewit-
ness identification.31 Fundamental fairness is not explicitly delineated 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court has nonethe-
 
22 See infra notes 175–265 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 275–295 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 296–333 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 30–174 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 30–47 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 48–89 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 90–147 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 148–174 and accompanying text. 
30 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 
18, 24 (1981) (discussing fundamental fairness in the context of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in a custody proceeding). 
31 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113; Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
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damental fairness.32 Despite its importance, defining fundamental fair-
ness has not been straightforward.33 
 The Court’s concerns about fundamental fairness are relevant in 
the context of eyewitness identification because a defendant’s rights 
can be compromised by a misidentification admitted at trial.34 In the 
1920s, the Court began interpreting the Due Process Clause to invali-
date criminal proceedings that were fundamentally unfair.35 In 1952, 
the Court concluded that due process of law “precludes defining, and 
thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to 
say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend ‘a 
sense of justice.’”36 Since then, the Court has tried to define what ex-
actly offends one’s sense of justice.37 
 To determine the methods that offend our sense of justice, the 
Court has looked at whether a civil38 or criminal proceeding was fun-
damentally fair.39 A criminal defendant is entitled to rights that, in the 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“But 
due process derives much of its meaning from a conception of fundamental fairness that 
emphasizes the right to make vital choices voluntarily . . . .”); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26 (ex-
plaining that the Fourteenth Amendment’s fundamental fairness provision at least guaran-
tees the right to counsel when one’s liberty is at stake); see also Laurence H. Tribe & Mi-
chael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 51 (1991) (“[F]or a very long time the 
Supreme Court has interpreted [the Due Process] clause to require at least some substan-
tive protection as well as protection for fair procedure.”). 
33 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24 (describing the requirement of fundamental fairness as “a 
requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty”). 
34 Stovall, 388 U.S. 176 at 302. 
35 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that a judge with a personal 
and pecuniary interest in deciding a case violated the Due Process Clause); see also Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (concluding that a trial court’s failure to give the de-
fendants reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in light of, among other 
things, the defendants’ youth, ignorance, and illiteracy, to be a denial of due process). In 
Brown v. Mississippi, decided in 1936, the Court held that a confession procured through 
torture violated the Due Process Clause because such methods offended principles of jus-
tice that Americans deem fundamental. See 297 U.S. 278, 285, 287 (1936) (deciding that 
coerced confessions offend “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))). In 1952, the Court in Rochin v. California held that forcibly re-
moving the contents of the defendant’s stomach violated his due process rights. 342 U.S. 
165, 172 (1952). 
36 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173 (quoting Brown, 297 U.S. at 286). 
37 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24–25. 
38 Id. at 33 (holding that due process did not require the appointment of counsel dur-
ing a custody hearing because this practice was not fundamentally unfair). 
39 See Rivera, 556 U.S. at 158 (“The Due Process Clause, our decisions instruct, safe-
guards not the meticulous observance of state procedural prescriptions, but ‘fundamental 
elements of fairness in a criminal trial.’” (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563–64 
(1967))). 
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context of American legal history, have been deemed fundamental to a 
fair proceeding.40 For example, due process precludes the government 
from using evidence it knows to be false.41 Furthermore, the Court has 
recognized that due process may constrain the admission of evidence at 
trial that “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental 
conceptions of justice.”42 
 In defining what comports with due process, the Court has been 
unwilling to find fundamental unfairness in the absence of police mis-
conduct.43 In Colorado v. Connelly, decided in 1986, the Court held that 
a mentally impaired defendant’s confession did not violate his due 
process rights because the police did not act coercively to obtain the 
confession.44 Even though the defendant was unable to confess freely, 
the Court held that exclusion of the confession would be justified only 
if the police used coercion to secure the confession.45 
                                                                                                                     
 In his dissent in Connelly, Justice William J. Brennan expressed 
concerns over the relationship between reliability, fundamental fair-
ness, and the Due Process Clause because of the impaired mental state 
of the confessor.46 Although the Court determined that state action was 
necessary for a confession to be deemed involuntary, Justice Brennan’s 
concerns over reliability and fundamental fairness are relevant in other 
criminal proceeding contexts, including the admissibility of eyewitness 
identifications.47 
B. Problems and Risks Associated with Eyewitness Identification 
 Since the 1970s, numerous studies have emerged that suggest eye-
witness identifications can be very unreliable.48 As early as the 1980s, 
experts observed that mistaken identifications were the cause of wrong-
 
40 See id.; see also Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and 
the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 105, 111 (2005) (“[T]he Court made 
clear that it regarded public perceptions of fairness of proceedings as serving a critical 
function in establishing the constitutional standards for due process in criminal trials.”). 
41 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 
42 See id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). 
43 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. 
44 Id. at 162, 167. 
45 Id. at 167. In Perry, the Court’s 2012 decision on eyewitness identification, the Court 
affirmed the focus on police misconduct in the debate over fundamental fairness. 132 S. 
Ct. at 726 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167); infra notes 122–147 and accompanying text. 
46 See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized 
the unfairness in admitting an unreliable confession. See id. 
47 See id. at 181 (“A concern for reliability is inherent in our criminal justice system, 
which relies upon accusatorial rather than inquisitorial practices.”). 
48 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 48. 
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ful convictions.49 Research continues to undermine the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, with a number of courts using this science to 
determine admissibility.50 
 With the advent of DNA as a tool for conviction and exoneration, 
the prevalence of misidentifications leading to wrongful convictions has 
become more apparent.51 As of 2011, out of 250 cases studied by the 
Innocence Project, 190 of those cases involved eyewitness misidentifica-
tions.52 In many wrongful conviction cases, multiple eyewitnesses iden-
tify the wrong person.53 Furthermore, in 2011 the American Psycho-
logical Association observed that controlled experiments and studies 
show that the rate of incorrect identifications is approximately thirty-
three percent.54 
 Critics contend that studies on eyewitness identification fail to du-
plicate reality.55 Studies often only use college students as witnesses in-
stead of a more realistic cross section of society.56 Additionally, stress is 
often not incorporated into the tests.57 Critics argue that experimental 
witnesses know that a misidentification does not have severe conse-
quences, and the data is therefore less accurate.58 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identifications: Systemic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 615, 
615–16 (noting that even in the 1970s psychologists had begun isolating variables that lead 
to unreliable identifications and observing that misidentifications are particularly common 
under certain situations). 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing recent 
studies on the unreliability of eyewitness identification); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 885–86 (cit-
ing the Innocence Project’s work on exonerations in cases where a witness misidentified 
the defendant and other studies questioning the reliability of eyewitness identification). 
51 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 885 (observing that misidentifications are the greatest 
cause of wrongful convictions in the United States (citing State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 
895 (N.J. 2006))); Garrett, supra note 8, at 48. 
52 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that eyewitnesses misidentified the exon-
erees in seventy-six percent of the cases where DNA exonerated a wrongfully convicted 
person). 
53 Brian L. Cutler & Margaret Bull Kovera, Evaluating Eyewitness Identifi-
cation 5 (2010) (“Laboratory, field, and archival research on eyewitness memory also 
suggests that eyewitnesses are capable of making mistakes and that mistaken identifications 
are very common.”). 
54 Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 14–15, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3488994, at *15 [hereinafter 
APA Amicus Brief]. 
55 See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 1, 6 (2009). 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
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 Nonetheless, the bulk of scientific opinion defends the studies 
demonstrating the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.59 The In-
nocence Project’s data supports these studies.60 There is general con-
sensus among the scientific community about the research undermin-
ing the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.61 Two major problems 
plague eyewitness identifications: suggestive identification procedures 
(System Variables) and the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifi-
cations (Estimator Variables).62 
1. Suggestive Identification Procedures: System Variables 
 System variables are variables that can be controlled by the criminal 
justice system, and include the way law enforcement officers conduct 
identification procedures.63 Human memory is malleable and suscepti-
ble to police suggestion.64 A showup is an example of a suggestive tech-
nique that may lead to a misidentification.65 During a showup, a witness 
confronts a single suspect directly or in a photograph and then makes 
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. 
60 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 48; Innocence Project, Reevaluating Lineups: Why 
Witnesses Make Mistakes and How to Reduce the Chance of a Misidentification 4 
(2009), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Eyewitness_ID_Report.pdf. 
61 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 911 (“The Special Master found broad consensus within 
the scientific community . . . .”); Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewit-
ness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 Am. Psychol. 405, 405 (2001). 
62 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21; Garrett, supra note 8, at 48. 
63 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21. System variables include blind administration, pre-
identification instructions, lineup construction, feedback, recording confidence, multiple 
viewings, showups, private actor involvement, and other identifications made by the eye-
witness, including whether the witness initially did not identify anyone or identified some-
one else. Id. 
64 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 108 (finding that the exhibition of a single photograph of 
the suspect was extremely suggestive); Garrett, supra note 8, at 49 (describing the police 
engaging in suggestive behavior in many cases where defendants were later exonerated, 
including indicating to the eyewitness who he should select during a lineup, using show-
ups where only one person is presented to the witness, and using lineups where the sus-
pect stands out). 
65 See Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 5, at 270. A showup is an example of a system 
variable because it is a suggestive technique controlled by law enforcement. See Henderson, 
27 A.3d at 920–21. 
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an identification.66 When a witness sees only one person, the witness is 
more likely to identify the suspect as the perpetrator.67 
 Other examples of suggestive procedures or system variables are 
simultaneous lineups and photo arrays.68 Research shows that a witness 
viewing people or photos simultaneously generally compares one photo 
or person to another and then decides who most closely resembles the 
offender.69 A sequential lineup, however, merely requires the witness to 
respond yes or no to each new person.70 Sequential lineup procedures 
produce fewer misidentifications than simultaneous procedures.71 
 It is also more difficult to make an accurate identification if lineup 
participants do not match the suspect’s description.72 A lineup where 
the witness is shown a color photograph of the suspect, but black-and-
white mug shots of other people, is suggestive.73 Police remarks, such as 
telling the witness which suspect to pick or reinforcing a witness’s iden-
tification, may also taint an identification.74 Police officers also preju-
                                                                                                                      
66 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (demonstrating an example of a showup where the wit-
ness saw the suspect one-on-one in the hospital and the Court acknowledged that the pro-
cedure was suggestive); Garrett, supra note 8, at 55–57; Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Big-
gers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy’s Due Process Protection, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 
1097, 1104 (1974) (defining a showup). 
67 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 55 (describing showups as one of the most suggestive 
identification procedures because they tell the witness who the suspect is and noting that 
their use has been “widely condemned”); see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 55, at 7 
(arguing that showups are suggestive in a different way from lineups because they suggest 
to the eyewitness which person to choose during an investigation, whereas a lineup offers a 
variety of suspects from which to choose). 
68 See Wells, supra note 49, at 625–26. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. (advocating for the use of sequential lineup procedures because they set a 
higher bar for a positive identification than simultaneous lineups and increase the odds of 
the witness making an accurate identification). 
71 See id. Some research suggests that under certain conditions (e.g., multiple perpe-
trators or children witnesses) sequential lineups might not lead to more accurate results 
than simultaneous lineups. See Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential 
and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 
459, 471 (2001). Nonetheless, the research indicates that overall, sequential lineups lead to 
more accurate results. Id.; Fix the System: Eyewitness Identification, Innocence Project, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited May 8. 
2013) (calling for the implementation of sequential, instead of simultaneous, lineups). 
72 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 57. 
73 See id. at 58 (discussing the case of Marvin Anderson, who was exonerated of a 1982 
rape by DNA evidence). Moreover, a lineup where only the suspect has facial hair or dis-
tinctive facial bumps is suggestive. See id. at 58–59 (discussing the cases of Ronnie Bullock 
and Lonnie Erby, who were identified during suggestive lineups, convicted, and subse-
quently exonerated because of DNA evidence). 
74 See id. at 59–61 (discussing cases involving police officers acting suggestively during 
an identification). 
1424 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
dice witnesses by informing them that the suspect is present in a lineup 
or by not informing them that the suspect might not be in the lineup at 
all.75 If a witness assumes the perpetrator is present, the witness will be 
more likely to identify someone, rather than inform the police that the 
suspect is not in the lineup.76 
2. The Frailties of Human Memory: Estimator Variables 
 A second problem with eyewitness identifications is their unreliabil-
ity, regardless of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.77 
The factors associated with the inherent unreliability of identifications 
are referred to as estimator variables—including factors related to the 
witness, the perpetrator, or the event—which cannot be controlled by 
the criminal justice system.78 
 Research indicates that human frailties jeopardize the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications.79 Human memory is extremely complex.80 
Significantly, critics contend that a witness’s certainty in identifying a 
suspect is not necessarily related to accuracy.81 Witnesses can develop a 
false sense of confidence once they make an identification.82 Addition-
ally, stress can also play a large role in making a misidentification.83 Al-
though a moderate amount of stress may increase attention to detail, 
                                                                                                                      
75 See id. at 60; Gary L. Wells et. al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations 
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 629–30 (1998). 
76 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 60. 
77 APA Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 12–13. 
78 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22. Estimator variables include environmental or per-
sonal factors such as stress, weapon focus, duration, distance and lighting, witness charac-
teristics, characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, racial bias, opportunity to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime, degree of attention, accuracy of the prior description 
of the criminal, level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time elapsed 
between the crime and the confrontation. Id. The Biggers factors used to determine reli-
ability, discussed in greater detail below, are criticized for being “deeply flawed” and not 
giving judges the adequate tools with which to evaluate reliability because they do not in-
clude all salient estimator variables. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 63 (describing the Biggers 
test as “so flexible as to be toothless”); infra notes 110–121 and accompanying text. 
79 See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 11 
Handbook of Psychology 149, 157 (Irving B. Weiner ed., 2003). 
80 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 894 (noting that human memory is not like a tape re-
cording that can be replayed to remember what happened). 
81 See Wells, supra note 49, at 620 (“Controlled experiments . . . show that eyewitnesses 
can be both highly confident (even ‘positive’) and yet totally mistaken in an eyewitness 
identification.”). 
82 See id. This false sense of confidence can cause a witness to become entrenched and 
seem even more convincing at trial even though the identification was actually erroneous. 
See id. 
83 See Cutler & Kovera, supra note 53, at 40. 
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high levels of stress can lead to misidentifications.84 The infirmities of 
cross-racial identification can also heighten the unreliability of eyewit-
ness identifications.85 Empirical research shows that witnesses more ac-
curately identify suspects of their own race than suspects of a different 
race.86 
 Research on eyewitness identification indicates that jurors give 
great weight to eyewitness testimony, and are often unable to separate 
reliable from unreliable testimony, making the admissibility of such 
evidence very important to criminal defendants.87 Justice Brennan rec-
ognized this problem when he wrote in his dissent in Watkins v. Sowders, 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981, “there is almost nothing 
more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a 
finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”88 Thus, eyewitness 
testimony disproportionally impacts jurors’ evaluation of a case and 
may lead to unjust outcomes.89 
C. The Supreme Court and Eyewitness Identification 
 Courts today evaluate the admissibility and reliability of eyewitness 
identifications using a test the Supreme Court articulated during the 
1960s and 1970s.90 The Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s 
right to fundamental fairness extends to the admissibility of eyewitness 
                                                                                                                      
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 37–38. A cross-racial identification is an identification of a person of one 
race by a person of a different race. See id. 
86 See APA Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 12 (citing a 2001 meta-analysis that encom-
passed thirty-nine research articles and nearly 5,000 participant witnesses, which “con-
cluded that cross-race identifications are 56 percent more likely to be erroneous than 
same-race identifications”). 
87 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 888–89; see also Loftus & Doyle, supra note 11, at 2 (de-
scribing a study in which a juror’s guilty verdict rose from eighteen percent to seventy-two 
percent when an eyewitness account was added to the evidence); Sandra Guerra Thomp-
son, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 603, 620 (2010) (“The scientific literature shows clearly that jurors 
(not to mention judges and lawyers) are not generally equipped to distinguish between 
reliable and unreliable identification evidence.”). 
88 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
89 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Loftus & Doyle, supra note 
11, at 5 (recounting a case where Connecticut jurors believed an eyewitness identification 
over testimony of an FBI director who testified that DNA evidence conclusively exonerated 
the particular defendant); Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification 
Evidence, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 185, 190 (1990) (discussing the great weight jurors place 
on eyewitness identification testimony). 
90 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972) (formulat-
ing a five factor test to determine reliability of an identification); infra notes 97–109 and 
accompanying text. 
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identifications.91 The Court, aware of the dangers associated with eye-
witness identification, has closely analyzed their use in criminal pro-
ceedings and implemented constitutional safeguards to ensure funda-
mentally fair trials.92 
 Eyewitness identifications have been a critical component of 
criminal trials for centuries, and the Court has been mindful of the 
need to continue their use in criminal proceedings.93 Despite their 
prevalence, eyewitness identification has been controversial for dec-
ades.94 In 1927, then-Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote, “The identifica-
tion of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.”95 Frankfurter described 
the hazards involved with introducing eyewitness identification testi-
mony at trial in both American and English courts.96 The Court recog-
nized these dangers and analyzed the admissibility of eyewitness identi-
fications under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.97 
1. The Wade Trilogy 
 In 1967, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of ad-
mitting eyewitness identification testimony at trial in a series of three 
cases, and concluded that eyewitness identifications warranted special 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113. In a concurring opinion in Perry, Justice Clarence Tho-
mas noted his disagreement with the reasoning of the Court’s due process analysis with 
regard to eyewitness identification. 132 S. Ct. at 730 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice 
Thomas found that the Stovall line of cases were wrongly decided because they were prem-
ised on a “substantive due process” right to fundamental fairness. Id. 
92 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); Wade, 388 
U.S. at 235. 
93 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272; Wade, 388 U.S. at 235; Amy 
Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential 
Lineup Pilot Project, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 381, 383 (2006) (“Eyewitness 
identification may be the oldest way of solving a case.”); Siegfried L. Sporer et al., Introduc-
tion: 200 Years of Mistaken Identification, in Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identifi-
cation 1, 3 (Siegfried L. Sporer et al. eds., 1996) (describing the case of Sergeant Le-
surques, who was identified and later executed for committing a robbery that occurred in 
1796 in France even though he had an alibi and thirteen other suspects were also identi-
fied as committing the same crime). Despite acknowledging the dangers of eyewitness 
identification, the Court recognized that eyewitness identifications are an important pros-
ecutorial tool. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 237. 




96 See id. 
97 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Wade, 388 U.S. at 235. 
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protections under the Sixth98 and Fourteenth Amendments.99 The stan-
dards and framework for evaluating the admissibility of eyewitness iden-
tification testimony stem from these cases.100 
 Criminal defendants can argue that the admission of an identifica-
tion violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.101 
In Stovall v. Denno, decided in 1967, the Court held that a claim seeking 
relief for denial of due process was a recognized attack on a conviction, 
independent of any Sixth Amendment claims.102 To prove that a de-
fendant’s due process rights have been violated, the identification must 
have been “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of 
law.”103 If the court determines that an identification meets this test, the 
defendant is entitled to have the pretrial identification excluded at 
trial.104 Whether an identification was unnecessarily suggestive depends 
                                                                                                                      
98 The Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is entitled to have 
counsel present during a pretrial lineup, where a witness is asked to identify a defendant as 
the perpetrator of a crime. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Wade, 
388 U.S. at 236–37. The defendant in Wade was indicted for conspiring to rob a bank, and 
without notice to his lawyer, was observed in a lineup by two bank employees. 388 U.S. at 
220. The Court deemed the pretrial lineup to be a “critical stage” of the proceeding, and 
held that the Sixth Amendment required counsel’s presence. See id. at 236–37; see also 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaches once judicial proceedings have been instigated against a defendant). The 
Court acknowledged the dangers of eyewitness misidentification and the potential for 
police officers or prosecutors to act suggestively in eliciting identifications from witnesses. 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals 
of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”). An attorney’s presence 
during a pretrial lineup may make the cross-examination of the witness at trial more mean-
ingful because the defense attorney can ask pointed and specific questions about the iden-
tification. See id. at 230. According to the Court, having an attorney present during a pre-
trial lineup also potentially reduces the likelihood of police misconduct or suggestiveness. 
See id. 
99 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (analyzing admissibility under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272 (using the Sixth Amendment rationale 
discussed in Wade to analyze admissibility); Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (analyzing admissibility 
under the Sixth Amendment). 
100 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 724, 726–27 (discussing Manson and Wade); Manson, 432 U.S. 
at 113 (analyzing admissibility under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and citing the Wade trilogy in its analysis). 
101 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
102 Id. at 299 (holding that a defendant may allege and prove a confrontation “resulted 
in such unfairness that it infringed his right to due process”). The defendant in Stovall was 
convicted after a witness made an in-court identification of the defendant after she had 
previously identified him during a showup in her hospital room. Id. at 295. 
103 See id. at 301–02. 
104 See id. 
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upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identifica-
tion.105 Suggestive procedures include showups, stacked lineups, and 
suggestive remarks said in front of or to the eyewitness.106 
 Courts must also determine whether an identification procedure 
was unnecessarily suggestive.107 A suggestive identification might be ad-
missible if those circumstances were the only way a witness could make 
the identification, as was the case in Stovall.108 The Court’s analysis in 
Stovall laid the groundwork for the Court’s future due process analysis 
of eyewitness identification.109 
2. A Focus on Reliability 
 Recognizing that certain identification procedures implicate the 
Due Process Clause, the Court articulated a test to determine when 
identifications are admissible.110 The Court’s test analyzes whether the 
identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive that it creates 
a substantial likelihood of misidentification in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.111 In addition to looking at the suggestiveness of the 
identification, in 1972 in Neil v. Biggers the Court added reliability as a 
factor in the admissibility analysis.112 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. at 302. 
106 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 55–62; supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text. 
107 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02. 
108 See id. at 302 (finding that a showup in the victim’s hospital room was the only way 
the police could have obtained an identification of the attacker, and consequently con-
cluding that the defendant was not entitled to relief). 
109 See, e.g., Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720 (acknowledging that a defendant could bring a due 
process claim challenging the admissibility of an eyewitness identification so long as there 
was some sort of police suggestiveness involved); Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 (analyzing the 
admissibility of an eyewitness identification under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) (using due 
process analysis to evaluate eyewitness identification in any suggestive circumstances), abro-
gated by Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 716; State v. Addison, 8 A.3d 118, 125 (N.H. 2010) (using federal 
due process jurisprudence as guidance for evaluating an eyewitness identification made 
under suggestive circumstances). 
110 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968). 
111 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383. In Simmons v. United States, de-
cided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968, the police showed photos of the accused to five 
bank employees who had witnessed the robbery to obtain an identification of the accused. 
390 U.S. at 380. At trial, the five witnesses identified Simmons as one of the robbers. Id. at 
381. On appeal, Simmons claimed the identification was so prejudicial that it tainted his 
conviction. Id. The Court used the test articulated in Stovall and rejected the defendant’s 
due process claim on the grounds that the police suggestion was necessary and there was 
little chance that the police procedure had led to a misidentification. Id. at 384–85. 
112 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 
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 According to the Court, the relevant factors to determine reliability 
include (1) the opportunity the witness had to view the criminal at the 
time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy 
of the witness’s prior description of the criminal, (4) the witness’s level 
of certainty at the time of the identification, and (5) the length of time 
between the crime and the identification (“Biggers factors”).113 If the 
defense shows that the identification was so unnecessarily suggestive that 
it might have led to a misidentification, then the trial judge weighs the 
five Biggers factors in a preliminary Wade hearing to determine whether 
the identification is reliable enough to be admitted.114 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1977, in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court further emphasized its 
focus on the reliability of the identification as an important part of its 
due process analysis.115 The Court held that due process does not require 
the exclusion of a pretrial identification that was unnecessarily sugges-
tive.116 The Court concluded, “[R]eliability is the linchpin in determin-
ing the admissibility of identification testimony.”117 Despite being un-
necessarily suggestive, an identification is admissible if a judge deter-
mines that under the totality of the circumstances it is reliable.118 
 The Manson Court declined to adopt a rule strictly excluding sug-
gestive identifications because the Court determined that a jury should 
hear evidence that is both reliable and relevant.119 The Court affirmed 
that the requirement for the admissibility of eyewitness identifications 
under the Due Process Clause is fairness, determined by the totality of 
the circumstances, and focused on the reliability of the identification 
 
113 Id. at 199–200. Using these factors, the Court found that there was not a substantial 
likelihood of misidentification and the evidence was therefore properly admitted. Id. at 
201. 
114 Manson, 432 U.S. at 106 (observing that the factors elucidated in Biggers are the rel-
evant factors for determining reliability); Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(using the Biggers factors to determine whether a showup identification was independently 
reliable); see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 55, at 3 (discussing the usage of the Biggers 
factors in Manson). 
115 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 
116 See id. In Manson, a police officer eyewitness identified the accused by a photograph 
that was left on his desk by another officer—a procedure deemed by the Court to be un-
necessarily suggestive. Id. at 101, 104. 
117 Id. at 114. 
118 Id. at 117 (finding the police officer’s identification was reliable based upon the to-
tality of the circumstances). The Wade trilogy of cases is still good law, but the Court in 
Manson added reliability as a crucial component of the admissibility analysis. See infra notes 
119–147 and accompanying text. 
119 Manson, 432 U.S. at 111–12. 
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based upon the five Biggers factors.120 Since 1977, courts have evaluated 
an identification’s suggestiveness and reliability to determine whether 
its admission comports with due process.121 
 The Court’s most recent decision regarding the admissibility of 
eyewitness identification is Perry v. New Hampshire, decided in 2012.122 
The Court, in an eight-to-one opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, held that the Due Process Clause does not require a prelimi-
nary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification 
when law enforcement did not arrange suggestive circumstances in pro-
curing the identification.123 Thus, it is up to the jury, not the judge, to 
weigh the reliability of eyewitness evidence in a criminal proceeding.124 
 In Perry, the defendant was charged in New Hampshire Superior 
Court with theft by unauthorized taking and criminal mischief after be-
ing identified at the scene of a crime.125 The witness said she saw Perry 
stealing items from a car as she looked out of her apartment window.126 
It was nighttime.127 The witness, when asked by a police officer for a de-
scription of the suspect, pointed out her window and identified Perry.128 
At the time of the identification, Perry was standing next to another of-
ficer.129 Later, the witness was unable to identify Perry in a photographic 
array.130 Nonetheless, the police officer and the eyewitness testified at 
                                                                                                                      
120 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall criticized the ma-
jority for attacking the protections that the Court implemented a decade before in the 
Wade trilogy. Id. at 118 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote that the “Due Proc-
ess Clause requires adherence to the same high standard of fundamental fairness in deal-
ing with every criminal defendant,” and concluded that the majority’s totality test would 
“allow seriously unreliable and misleading evidence to be put before juries.” Id. at 128. 
Justice Marshall concluded that the adoption of a per se exclusionary rule would enhance 
the “effective administration of justice.” Id. 
121 See, e.g., United States v. De León-Quiñones, 588 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 2009) (using 
a two-step inquiry involving suggestiveness and reliability to determine the admissibility of 
an identification); Ercole, 565 F.3d at 88 (using the totality of the circumstances test de-
scribed in Stovall to evaluate identification testimony); United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 
1506, 1516 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reliability analysis in Manson), 
abrogated by Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 716; Ford v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:08-cv-1975-T-23EAJ, 
2011 WL 5572618, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2011). 
122 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 728. 
125 Id. at 722. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 721. 
128 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1431 
trial that the witness had identified Perry as the thief on the night that 
the crime had occurred.131 A jury found Perry guilty of theft.132 
 Before trial, Mr. Perry moved to suppress the identification on due 
process grounds.133 The New Hampshire Superior Court denied the 
motion and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tion.134 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the ques-
tion whether due process requires a preliminary hearing to determine 
the reliability of an identification made under suggestive circumstances 
not orchestrated by law enforcement.135 The Court, relying on prece-
dent and unwilling to tamper with a widely used evidentiary tool, an-
swered this question in the negative.136 
 The Court highlighted the importance of deterring police miscon-
duct through suppressing evidence.137 If deterrence is the main goal, 
the Court reasoned that requiring judicial inquiry into eyewitness iden-
tifications where no police suggestiveness is involved would be futile.138 
Moreover, the Court emphasized its concern that requiring preliminary 
inquiries by the court would take the reliability determination away 
from the jury.139 The Court cited other safeguards, such as the Sixth 
Amendment right to have counsel present during a post-indictment 
pretrial lineup and evidentiary rules, as sufficient to ensure that crimi-
nal trials are fundamentally fair.140 




134 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722–23. 
135 Id. at 723. Although the circumstances surrounding the identification were sugges-
tive—there was only one suspect, and he was standing next to a police officer—the police 
officer did not arrange the suggestive circumstances because the witness spontaneously 
pointed at Perry. See id. at 722. 
136 Id. at 721. 
137 Id. at 726. 
138 Id. This rationale is similar to that proposed by the Court in its analysis of the exclu-
sionary rule in cases involving the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
648 (1961); see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (holding that 
negligent police conduct is not sufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule because the de-
terrent effect of suppression on police misconduct is the primary rationale for excluding 
evidence); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (creating a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule in situations where a magistrate erred and highlighting that 
the exclusionary rule is “designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the 
error of judges and magistrates”). 
139 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728. 
140 Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or need-
lessly presenting cumulative evidence.”); N.H. R. Evid. 403 (same). 
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 The Court concluded that when there is no improper police con-
duct involved in an identification, there is no need for a pretrial deter-
mination of reliability.141 Thus, because law enforcement did not arrange 
the suggestive circumstances in Perry, and because other constitutional 
and evidentiary safeguards were present during Perry’s proceeding, the 
introduction of eyewitness testimony without a preliminary reliability 
determination did not violate Perry’s right to a fundamentally fair pro-
ceeding.142 
 Perry eliminated federal due process claims where no police or-
chestration is involved in procuring a suggestive identification.143 In the 
future, courts will conduct a threshold inquiry when a defendant chal-
lenges the admissibility of an identification on due process grounds.144 
First, the defense will have to prove that police suggestiveness was in-
volved.145 Only if the defense succeeds in showing police suggestiveness 
will a court apply the Biggers factors to evaluate whether the identifica-
tion was so unnecessarily suggestive that it would lead to a misidentifi-
cation.146 Yet, states are free to interpret their own constitutions in such 
a way to grant greater individual rights than the U.S. Constitution.147 
D. State Approaches to Eyewitness Identification 
 Despite the risks associated with eyewitness identification, most 
police units do not have standardized approaches for conducting line-
ups or photo arrays.148 In Perry, the Supreme Court limited due process 
                                                                                                                      
 
141 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730. The Court did not apply the Biggers factors in Perry because 
the reliability analysis is performed only if unnecessarily suggestive circumstances sur-
round the identification. See id. 
142 Id. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the sole dissenter, disagreed with the majority’s holding 
that due process is implicated only when police suggestiveness procures an identification. 
Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see infra notes 203–206 and accompanying text. 
143 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 726; United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 382 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Recently, 
in Perry v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court directed that courts should not 
reach the reliability inquiry unless the identification resulted from a situation created by 
improper police conduct.”); supra note 113 and accompanying text (laying out the Biggers 
factors). 
147 See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 536 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michi-
gan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brennan, supra note 19, at 
491. 
148 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 53 (describing a case of misidentification in which an 
officer admitted at a preliminary hearing that “he had never been trained on how to cre-
ate a photo array”); Fix the System: Eyewitness Identification, supra note 71 (“Most law en-
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claims involving eyewitness identifications to identifications involving 
police suggestiveness (i.e., system variables).149 Some state courts, how-
ever, have begun interpreting their own constitutions in a way that 
more fully incorporates the scientific data.150 
 For example, some state courts have attempted to reduce the dan-
ger of a persuasive erroneous identification by using testimony of eye-
witness identification experts to educate jurors and by providing en-
hanced jury instructions.151 These measures, however, have been criti-
cized for not adequately alerting jurors to the dangers of eyewitness 
misidentifications.152 Testimony from experts can be effective in warn-
ing jurors, but courts are not always willing to allow this testimony.153 
Jury instructions may reinforce faulty assumptions or they may be long, 
complicated, and confusing.154 Furthermore, some states have not 
                                                                                                                      
forcement agencies use the same methods they have used for decades—live and photo 
lineups, usually conducted without a blind administrator or proper instructions.”). 
149 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
150 See, e.g., Walker, 953 N.E.2d at 209–10 (indicating a willingness to revisit jurispru-
dence regarding eyewitness identification in light of updated science but refusing to do so 
here); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919 (concluding a modified framework incorporating the last 
thirty years of scientific developments on eyewitness identification should be incorporated 
into New Jersey law). 
151 See Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 5, at 289–90. 
152 See id. (describing the ineffectiveness of limiting juror instructions); see also Har-
mon M. Hosch et al., Expert Psychology Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Consensus Among 
Experts?, in Expert Testimony on the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification 143, 
159 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (citing a study where the average juror had insufficient 
knowledge of factors influencing an eyewitness identification); Thompson, supra note 87, 
at 630 (noting that cross-examination is not an effective way of “making jurors aware of 
some of the counterintuitive facts relating to eyewitness identification accuracy”). 
153 See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need 
to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—And Not Just the Methodological—Aspects 
of Science, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 29–30 (2003) (discussing a case where the appellate court con-
firmed that psychological studies on the limitations of perception and memory in eyewit-
ness identifications are an appropriate subject of expert testimony); see also Roy S. Malpass 
et al., The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, in Expert Testi-
mony on the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification, supra note 152, at 15, 21–22 
(discussing the value of experts as “educators” to the jury and the widespread agreement 
in the scientific community about the findings of eyewitness identification researchers). 
154 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 190 (1979) (discussing some of 
the problems associated with cautionary jury instructions, including the fact that judges 
are not experts in the field and that jury instructions tend to be long and tedious); Chris-
tian Sheehan, Note, Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness Identification Jury 
Instructions, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 651, 679–80 (2011) (describing the advantages and shortcom-
ings of jury instructions on eyewitness identification testimony). 
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adopted any of these reforms, and the results are mixed among federal 
courts.155 
 Some states have declined to follow the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence regarding eyewitness identification and have established new 
standards to evaluate reliability.156 In 1986, in State v. Long, the Utah Su-
preme Court criticized the inadequacies of the five Biggers factors for 
failing to encompass “well-respected and essentially unchallenged em-
pirical studies,” and came up with its own test to assess reliability.157 The 
Utah court adopted three additional factors to promote greater accu-
racy, namely, (1) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, (2) whether 
the identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent, 
and (3) the nature of the event being observed.158 The Long court also 
held that trial courts are required to issue cautionary jury instructions 
whenever an eyewitness identification is central to a case and defense 
counsel requests the instruction.159 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court also recognized that it can inter-
pret Wisconsin’s due process clause differently from the U.S. Constitu-
tion.160 The Wisconsin Supreme Court implemented more stringent 
standards to determine the admissibility of showups.161 
                                                                                                                      
155 See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 701 S.E.2d 554, 557 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (declining to find 
an abuse of discretion where a trial judge refused to give a more specific jury instruction 
on reliability and cross-racial identifications); see also Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 5, at 
294–97 (discussing the three-way split among federal courts regarding the admissibility of 
testimony by eyewitness identification experts, including a complete bar to expert testi-
mony, a case-by-case approach, and courts finding expert testimony admissible); Thomp-
son, supra note 87, at 628 (“As a general rule, courts have denied requests for jury instruc-
tions or expert witnesses to assist jurors in evaluating the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence.”). 
156 See, e.g., Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21 (New Jersey); People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 
379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981) (New York); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) 
(Utah); Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 592–93 (Wisconsin). 
157 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986). The Biggers factors include the opportunity the wit-
ness had to view the perpetrator, the witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the wit-
ness’s prior description, the witness’s level of certainty at the time of the identification, and 
the lapse of time between the crime and the identification. See supra note 113 and accom-
panying text. 
158 Long, 721 P.2d at 493; see also Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (affirming the Utah Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Long and utilizing Long’s altered test to determine reliability); 
Thompson, supra note 87, at 625–26 (describing the court’s reasoning in Ramirez). 
159 721 P.2d at 492. 
160 Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 597 (“[W]e retain the right to interpret our constitution to 
provide greater protections than its federal counterpart.”). 
161 Id. at 593–94 (concluding that a showup would not be necessary unless the police 
lacked probable cause to arrest a suspect or because exigent circumstances prevented the 
police from conducting a photo array or lineup). 
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 In 1981, the New York Court of Appeals noted the importance that 
identifications can play in determining guilt or innocence.162 The court 
held that a pretrial identification procured using unnecessarily sugges-
tive procedures would be excluded at trial under the New York Consti-
tution.163 The court concluded that a showup conducted in front of 
two victims together was unnecessarily suggestive, but the error was 
harmless because there was a valid in-court identification.164 
                                                                                                                     
 Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed reliability 
concerns by implementing safeguards under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion to ensure that jurors do not hear unreliable identification testi-
mony.165 In 2011, in State v. Henderson, the court proposed a revised 
framework for resolving some of the problems associated with eyewit-
ness identification.166 The court directed New Jersey’s lower courts to 
consider a nonexhaustive list of system variables, including lineup con-
struction, feedback, recording confidence, multiple viewings, showups, 
and private actor involvement.167 
 Furthermore, to evaluate the overall reliability of an identification, 
New Jersey courts will now consider a non-exhaustive list of estimator 
variables including stress, weapon focus, duration, distance and lighting, 
witness characteristics, characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, 
racial bias, opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 
degree of attention, accuracy of the prior description of the criminal, 
level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time 
elapsed between the crime and the confrontation.168 Some of these fac-
tors overlap with the five Biggers factors.169 The court concluded that if a 
 
162 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383–84. 
163 See N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law.”); Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383. 
164 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384. 
165 See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 (“All persons are by nature free and independent, and 
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing 
and obtaining safety and happiness.”); State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 943 (N.J. 2011); Hender-
son, 27 A.3d at 920–21. 
166 See 27 A.3d at 920–21; Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Sweeping Shift on Witness IDs, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2011, at A1 (discussing New Jersey’s new procedures regarding eye-
witness identifications that broadened the factors to consider when assessing reliability and 
their significance). 
167 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21; supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining system variables). 
168 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22; supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text (explaining 
estimator variables). 
169 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22; see supra note 113 and accompanying text (outlining 
the Biggers factors). 
1436 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
defendant presents some evidence of suggestiveness, the judge would 
then evaluate both the system and estimator variables to determine reli-
ability at a pretrial hearing.170 
 By adopting this framework, the court sought to incorporate mod-
ern science to “promote fair trials and ensure the integrity of the judi-
cial process.”171 Contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Perry, 
New Jersey had already extended the Henderson analysis to include any 
type of suggestiveness by a public or private actor.172 The New Jersey 
court concluded that the Manson test for reliability, which uses the five 
Biggers factors, does not adequately measure reliability or deter police 
misconduct, and that it “overstates the jury’s innate ability to evaluate 
eyewitness testimony.”173 Consequently, the court came up with its own 
framework incorporating all relevant system and estimator variables, 
and directed courts to use enhanced jury charges to help jurors ade-
quately evaluate eyewitness identification testimony.174 
II. The Dangers and the Constitutionality of  
Eyewitness Identification 
 Criminal defendants have the right to due process of law under the 
U.S. Constitution.175 This right includes barring the admission of identi-
fications that are so unnecessarily suggestive that they would lead to a 
misidentification.176 This Part argues that the interplay between due 
process, reliability, and Supreme Court precedent suggests that a defen-
dant’s right to a fundamentally fair proceeding is undermined by the 
admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications.177 Section A high-
lights the importance of due process concerns in the context of eyewit-
ness identification.178 Section B outlines the problems and limitations of 
                                                                                                                      
170 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–22. 
171 See id. at 928. 
172 Compare Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721 (holding that due process claims for pretrial judicial 
hearings to exclude eyewitness identifications are only available when there has been some 
police suggestiveness), with Chen, 27 A.3d at 943 (allowing for pretrial hearings on the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications when there was any suggestiveness in procuring 
the identification). 
173 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918. 
174 Id. at 919. 
175 U.S. Const. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. 
176 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 181 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Man-
son v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967), 
overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
177 See infra notes 181–265 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 181–193 and accompanying text. 
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the Court’s analysis in Perry v. New Hampshire.179 Section C analyzes the 
future of eyewitness identification in post-Perry criminal proceedings.180 
A. The Importance of Due Process in the Context of Eyewitness Identification 
 Due process plays an essential role in eyewitness identification 
analysis because the dangers of a misidentification can undermine a 
defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair proceeding.181 To combat the 
risk of misidentification, the Supreme Court held that criminal defen-
dants could raise due process claims if an identification was so unneces-
sarily suggestive that it would lead to a misidentification.182 
 Due process, in any context, is not a stagnant concept.183 Woodrow 
Wilson wrote in 1908, “[T]he Constitution of the United States is not a 
mere lawyer’s document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the 
spirit of the age.”184 This is especially relevant in the context of eyewit-
ness identification because recent scientific discoveries show that fun-
damental fairness can mean something different in 2013 than it meant 
thirty-five years ago.185 If the Constitution is the spirit of the age, then it 
is necessary to incorporate new scientific research and norms into tra-
ditional conceptions of fundamental fairness.186 This means revisiting 
and revising the five Biggers factors and eyewitness identification juris-
prudence to reflect modern science.187 
 The right to due process must include an established framework to 
ensure fundamental fairness.188 The rules should create a system where 
only evidence that comports with due process is admitted at trial.189 The 
great unreliability of eyewitness identifications, in addition to their great 
influence on a criminal proceeding, suggest that a defendant’s right to a 
fundamentally fair proceeding is violated by the admission of unreliable 
                                                                                                                      
179 See infra notes 194–244 and accompanying text. 
180 See infra notes 245–265 and accompanying text. 
181 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012); Manson, 432 U.S. at 
113; Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
182 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02. 
183 See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 69 
(1908). 
184 Id. 
185 See supra notes 30–89 and accompanying text. 
186 See Wilson, supra note 183, at 69; supra notes 30–47 and accompanying text. 
187 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011); supra notes 48–89 and accom-
panying text. 
188 See People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981) (“A defendant’s right to due 
process would be only theoretical if it did not encompass the need to establish rules to 
accomplish that end.”). 
189 See id. 
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eyewitness testimony at trial.190 Accurate eyewitness identifications are, 
however, beneficial crime-fighting and prosecutorial tools.191 By focus-
ing on reliability, the Court has attempted to find a balance between 
admitting identifications and preserving due process rights.192 If reliabil-
ity is the linchpin of the analysis, then only reliable identifications 
should be admissible.193 
B. Problems with Eyewitness Identification Jurisprudence and the Limitations of 
the Supreme Court’s Analysis in Perry 
 The problems with eyewitness identifications that have the poten-
tial to undermine due process rights and fundamental fairness focus on 
(1) the type of suggestiveness involved with the identification, and (2) 
how to determine reliability.194 These two concepts are directly corre-
lated; the more suggestive an identification procedure, the more sus-
ceptible it is to being unreliable.195 Yet, the solutions for both can be 
distinct.196 Courts can eliminate the first problem simply by adopting a 
more robust test for determining reliability.197 
 In Perry, the Court dealt with the first problem—determining the 
type of suggestiveness that is required to support a due process 
claim.198 The Court held that police suggestiveness must be present to 
bring a due process claim.199 In cases where police suggestiveness is in-
                                                                                                                      
190 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 48–49; supra notes 30–89 and accompanying text. 
Admitting inaccurate eyewitness identification testimony, like admitting a coerced confes-
sion, can be damning for a criminal defendant. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 
(1936) (excluding a confession procured through coercion). 
191 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 112, 117 (holding that the police officer’s identification, 
though suggestive, was reliable); Wells, supra note 49, at 631–32 (advocating for procedural 
reforms rather than complete exclusion of eyewitness identifications). 
192 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 112. 
193 See id.; supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
194 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 
195 See id. at 112 (“The witness’ recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by 
the circumstances or by later actions of the police.”); supra notes 63–76 and accompanying 
text. 
196 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; supra notes 48–147 and accompanying text; infra notes 
296–333 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra notes 296–333 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey’s robust test). 
198 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
199 See id. This was not surprising given the Court’s holding in 1986 in Colorado v. Con-
nelly, where the Court required state action to exclude a coerced confession on due proc-
ess grounds. See 479 U.S. at 167. Accordingly, a defendant cannot assert a due process 
claim if a private actor acted suggestively while a witness made an identification. See Perry, 
132 S. Ct. at 721. 
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volved, defendants can still assert that admitting an unreliable identifi-
cation violated their due process rights.200 
ss.203 
                                                                                                                     
 The Perry majority, however, failed to consider several salient 
claims.201 The majority emphasized the deterrence rationale for ex-
cluding eyewitness identifications when police suggestiveness is in-
volved to support its conclusion that courts only need to engage in a 
reliability determination if the police orchestrated a suggestive identifi-
cation.202 Yet, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor correctly noted in her dissent, 
if reliability were truly the linchpin of the analysis, then any type of sug-
gestiveness should implicate due proce
 Justice Sotomayor aptly noted that the Court’s concerns with the 
reliability of eyewitness identification articulated in Stovall v. Denno and 
Manson v. Brathwaite only involved the jury hearing unreliable eyewit-
ness testimony.204 Consequently, she correctly attacked the majority for 
including the mens rea of police officers conducting an eyewitness 
identification procedure in the Court’s due process analysis because it 
creates a “murky distinction” between suggestive confrontations orches-
trated by the police and situations inadvertently caused by police ac-
tions.205 This confusion ignores the dangers of allowing the jury to hear 
a witness give an unreliable identification at trial.206 
 The Court in Perry also emphasized the importance of maintaining 
the jury as the primary arbiter of reliability.207 Although this is a worthy 
goal, the Court unconvincingly compared unreliable identification tes-
timony with the testimony of government informants.208 A jailhouse 
snitch is markedly different from a sympathetic rape victim or a neutral 
bystander.209 A jury would likely have an easier time acknowledging 
motives and bias behind an informant’s testimony than it would ac-
 
200 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
201 See id.; supra notes 122–147 and accompanying text. 
202 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726. 
203 See id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that due process concerns stem 
from the adverse effects that any type of suggestiveness has on the reliability of an identifi-
cation, not the act of suggestion itself). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 734. 
206 Id. at 735. 
207 See id. at 728 (majority opinion). 
208 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728. The Court noted that in other contexts, including evi-
dence of government informants, potential unreliability alone does not render a trial fun-
damentally unfair. Id. 
209 See id. at 737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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knowledging the frailties of human memory and perception that are 
involved when an eyewitness makes an identification.210 
                                                                                                                     
 The Court had legitimate reasons for limiting the scope of due 
process claims and for issuing a narrow holding in Perry.211 The jury is 
an integral part of the criminal process.212 Jurors are the fact-finders of 
a criminal case and it is their responsibility to evaluate credibility.213 
Shifting this responsibility from jurors to a judge would be a dramatic 
and potentially unfair shift.214 Precedent also indicates that the admis-
sion of unreliable evidence does not necessarily lead to a fundamentally 
unfair proceeding.215 
 The Court’s reasoning, however, ignores the uniqueness of eyewit-
ness identification.216 In its 1967 decision in United States v. Wade, and in 
subsequent eyewitness identification cases, the U.S. Supreme Court rec-
ognized that eyewitness identifications pose specific dangers.217 It was this 
concern that prompted the Court to hold that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches during a post-indictment, pretrial lineup.218 
Furthermore, the majority barely addressed the scientific data highlight-
ing the risks involved with eyewitness identification.219 This empirical 
data demonstrates the dangers of eyewitness identification and the need 
for evaluating suggestiveness broadly.220 
 Judges may be as ill-equipped as jurors to distinguish between reli-
able and unreliable identifications.221 If this is true, it suggests that 
judges would be ineffective gatekeepers.222 Nonetheless, the judge 
would only act as the gatekeeper, and a jury would still determine 
guilt.223 Indeed, the dangers of letting the jury hear an unreliable iden-
 
210 See id. 
211 See id. at 728 (majority opinion). 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728. 
215 See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 (2009) (holding that an informant’s 
testimony, elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible at trial to chal-
lenge inconsistent testimony). 
216 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. 
217 See id.; supra notes 90–147 and accompanying text. 
218 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 230, 237 (noting that an identification may be more suscepti-
ble to police suggestion without the watchful eye of a defense attorney overseeing the pro-
cedure); supra note 98 (explaining the Sixth Amendment implications of eyewitness iden-
tification). 
219 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
220 See id. 
221 See Thompson, supra note 87, at 620. 
222 See id. 
223 See Hosch et al., supra note 152, at 158–59. 
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tification outweigh concerns about traditional roles.224 Studies show 
that eyewitness testimony has a significant and lasting impact on juries, 
who then decide guilt or innocence based upon potentially inaccurate 
and unreliable evidence.225 
 In addition to the problem of the suggestiveness and the limitations 
of Perry, there remains a second problem: how to evaluate the reliability 
of an identification.226 Since the 1970s, courts have used the five Biggers 
factors to evaluate reliability.227 Yet, studies suggest there is an inherent 
unreliability in eyewitness identification that the Biggers factors do not 
satisfactorily take into account.228 The solution to ensuring due process 
at trial may be to reformulate the Biggers factors to take into account the 
new data, at least in situations involving police suggestiveness.229 This is 
possible within the framework set by Perry, which merely limits the due 
process analysis to situations involving police suggestiveness.230 New Jer-
sey’s new multi-factor test contains helpful suggestions to amend the 
Biggers factors.231 
 Substantial amounts of research indicate that eyewitness identifica-
tions have serious flaws.232 In 1995, a judge on the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court wrote that scientific studies conducted since 1977 
have confirmed that eyewitness identifications are often “hopelessly un-
reliable.”233 The malleability and vulnerability of human memory high-
light the dangers involved with eyewitness identification.234 Because of 
these risks, identifications should be scrutinized closely to avoid miscar-
riages of justice.235 The Court in Perry, however, largely ignored the data 
                                                                                                                      
224 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
225 See Loftus & Doyle, supra note 11, at 2; supra notes 48–89 and accompanying text. 
226 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21; Loftus & Doyle, supra note 11, at 2. 
227 See, e.g., Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 2009); State v. Addison, 8 A.3d 118, 
124 (N.H. 2010). 
228 See Loftus & Doyle, supra note 11, at 10–11; supra notes 48–89 and accompanying 
text. 
229 See Thompson, supra note 87, at 608–09. 
230 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
231 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21; supra notes 165–174 and accompanying text. 
232 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 48; supra notes 48–89 and accompanying text. 
233 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995). The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court rejected the reliability test articulated in Manson and adopted a 
per se exclusion rule when defendants demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that an identification was unnecessarily suggestive and offensive to due process. Id. at 1265. 
234 See id. at 1261. 
235 See id.; APA Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 6; Brief for The Innocence Network as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5–6, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 
3439922, at *15. 
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by barely addressing it and by maintaining the Biggers factors.236 Such a 
result seems incompatible under jurisprudence that deems due process 
a fundamental right.237 
 Human memory is not a video recording.238 A witness under stress, 
in the presence of a weapon, or making a cross-racial identification has 
a greater likelihood of misidentifying a suspect.239 The five Biggers fac-
tors may be inadequate to safeguard against unreliable testimony at 
trial because they do not take these important factors into account.240 
Notably, the fourth Biggers factor, the witness’s level of certainty at the 
time of the identification, is particularly misleading.241 Despite these 
scientific findings, many judges are reluctant to suppress eyewitness 
identifications.242 This is not surprising, especially in situations where 
there may be no other evidence.243 The Supreme Court, however, 
failed to address the inadequacy of the Biggers factors in Perry.244 
                                                                                                                     
C. Life After Perry: The Future of Eyewitness Identification 
 Perry limited defendants’ right to challenge identifications on due 
process grounds to situations where law enforcement orchestrated sug-
gestive identification procedures.245 Nevertheless, the battle against the 
admission of unreliable evidence at criminal trials is not over.246 Defen-
dants can still raise evidentiary arguments, citing either the Federal 
Rules of Evidence or state evidence rules that allow judges to exclude 
evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its preju-
dicial effect.247 The Court in Perry specifically cited this evidentiary op-
 
236 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
237 See id. 
238 See Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness, Target, and Situational Factors on Eye-
witness Identifications, in Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification, supra note 
93, at 23, 25 (listing a variety of factors that influence memory). 
239 See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 
277, 280 (2003) (describing types of witnesses). 
240 See supra notes 77–89, 110–114 and accompanying text. 
241 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 63–64. 
242 See id. at 77. 
243 See id. Jennifer Thompson’s rape case demonstrates both the importance of an eye-
witness identification in a rape case and its dangers. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying 
text. 
244 See 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
245 Id.; see supra notes 122–147 and accompanying text. 
246 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721; see infra notes 247–265 and accompanying text. 
247 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 729. 
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tion as a curative measure if a preliminary hearing is not required.248 
Yet these options are not satisfactory alternatives.249 
 Based upon the scientific data suggesting that jurors put an inor-
dinate amount of weight on eyewitness testimony, one could imagine a 
situation where a judge excludes an identification that would confuse 
the jury so much that the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect.250 But it is not obvious that this would be the 
norm.251 In a climate where some judges are hesitant to give jury in-
structions on the frailties of eyewitness identifications or to allow expert 
testimony, it seems unlikely that judges will use traditional evidentiary 
rules in a new way to exclude evidence.252 Because Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403 is weighted toward admissibility, a defendant will bear a 
heavy burden to show that the admission of the testimony is unduly 
prejudicial.253 
 Nonetheless, in 2012, the Oregon Supreme Court used evidentiary 
rules, including Oregon’s version of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 
Oregon Evidence Code Rule 602’s personal knowledge requirement, 
and Oregon Evidence Code Rule 701’s regarding the requirements of 
lay opinion testimony, to go even further than the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in recognizing the fallibility of eyewitness identification evi-
dence.254 The court concluded that the scientific discoveries of the last 
thirty-five years indicate that the methodology that Oregon courts had 
been using to test the reliability of eyewitness identifications (similar to 
the federal Manson test), was inadequate.255 To increase reliability, the 
court shifted the burden to the government to “establish all prelimi-
nary facts necessary to establish admissibility of the eyewitness evi-
dence.”256 The decision requires trial courts to consider all relevant es-
timator and system variables to determine reliability.257 Oregon’s ap-
proach represents a positive step by a state court to cure some of the 
problems associated with eyewitness identification.258 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                      
248 Id. 
249 See id. at 739 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
250 See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
251 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 80 (describing how many judges do not explain to the 
jury relevant social science research on the potential effects of police suggestion). 
252 See id. at 77. 
253 See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The Rule calls for admission unless the probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by a prejudicial effect. See id. 
254 State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 692–94, 697 (Or. 2012). 
255 Id. at 690. 
256 Id. at 696–97. 
257 Id. at 685–88. 
258 See id. at 697. 
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from an academic and analytical standpoint, New Jersey’s approach 
seems to capture more accurately the importance of a defendant’s right 
to a fundamentally fair proceeding by deciding the admissibility of 
identification testimony on due process grounds.259 
 In addition to the evidentiary option, the Supreme Court has left 
defendants with the tools of jury instructions, expert testimony explain-
ing the dangers of eyewitness identification,260 and rigorous cross-
examination.261 Enhanced use of these options may contribute to fairer 
proceedings, but they are not enough to battle the inherent dangers of 
eyewitness identification.262 
 Defendants should challenge the validity of the Biggers factors in 
state courts as a fundamentally unfair way of assessing reliability when 
police suggestiveness is involved.263 Defendants can point to the vast 
amount of social science and to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s recent 
decision as a more fair methodology for evaluating reliability.264 To en-
sure that a defendant has access to fundamentally fair proceedings, 
state courts should adopt more robust measures that would prevent 
misidentifications from appearing in court.265 
III. A Call for State Court Action to Address the Dangers of 
Eyewitness Identification 
 In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 2012 in Perry v. New 
Hampshire and the severe dangers of admitting unreliable eyewitness 
identification testimony, state courts should interpret their constitutions 
                                                                                                                      
259 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928; supra notes 181–193 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 296–333 and accompanying text. 
260 See Malpass et al., supra note 153, at 21–22. Experts on eyewitness identification are 
helpful in explaining to jurors that eyewitness identifications are less accurate than they 
think. See Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, The Influence of Eyewitness Expert Testimony 
on Jurors’ Beliefs and Judgments, in Expert Testimony on the Psychology of Eyewitness 
Identification, supra note 152, at 169, 175 (discussing the value of expert testimony in 
explaining to jurors the intricacies involved with eyewitness identifications). Expert testi-
mony can also educate jurors about the nature of eyewitness memory. See id. This leaves 
the reliability question with the jury, but allows jurors to make a more informed decision 
about how much weight to attribute to a witness’s identification. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728 
(explaining the Court’s unwillingness to remove from the jury its traditional role of de-
termining the reliability of evidence). 
261 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
262 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925–26; State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467–68 (N.J. 
1999) (requiring New Jersey courts to issue jury instructions for cross-racial identifications 
twelve years before Henderson), abrogated by Henderson, 27 A.3d 872. 
263 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919; State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 592 (Wis. 2005). 
264 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
265 See infra notes 273–333 and accompanying text. 
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to grant greater protections than the U.S. Constitution.266 Prior to Perry, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court took action.267 It has long been acknowl-
edged that states may interpret their own constitutions to grant greater 
rights than those granted under the U.S. Constitution.268 In addition to 
interpreting their own constitutions more liberally, state courts could 
also use their supervisory powers to make procedural rules to ensure 
that defendants have access to fundamentally fair trials.269 
 This Part argues that state courts should grant greater protections 
under their own constitutions in the field of eyewitness identifica-
tion.270 Section A argues that state courts are the appropriate courts for 
granting these protections, that they have done this in other contexts, 
and that they should grant greater protections in the context of eyewit-
ness identification.271 Section B advocates using the New Jersey Su-
preme Court’s recent approach as a model for evaluating the admissi-
bility of eyewitness identifications.272 
                                                                                                                     
A. State Courts Can and Should Reform Eyewitness Identification 
 In 1977, Justice William J. Brennan wrote, “State constitutions, too, 
are a font of individual liberties.”273 Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized limited due process protections for eyewitness identifi-
cation under the U.S. Constitution, state courts and legislatures should 
do more to ensure that fundamental fairness is protected by excluding 
unreliable eyewitness identifications.274 In light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Perry, where the Court was unwilling to reformulate its eye-
witness identification jurisprudence to account for new scientific data 
and thus called into question the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
 
266 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872, 928 (N.J. 2011). 
267 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
268 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (recognizing that the 
“authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own 
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Con-
stitution” is not limited); Brennan, supra note 19, at 491. 
269 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosario, 661 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Mass. 1996); infra notes 276–
278 and accompanying text. 
270 See infra notes 273–333 and accompanying text. 
271 See infra notes 273–295 and accompanying text. 
272 See infra notes 296–333 and accompanying text. 
273 Brennan, supra note 19, at 491. 
274 See id. 
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and the continued use of the five Biggers factors, it is necessary for the 
states to take action.275 
 State (and federal) courts can create procedural and evidentiary 
standards through their supervisory powers.276 Although the use of su-
pervisory powers has been somewhat limited on the federal level, it can 
still be a powerful tool for state courts to ensure that judicial integrity is 
preserved, especially in criminal proceedings.277 Indeed, some state 
supreme courts have already exercised their supervisory powers in the 
criminal sphere.278 
 States are in a good position to grant protections regarding eye-
witness identifications because the majority of criminal trials are state 
court proceedings, and therefore states have the power to affect the 
                                                                                                                      
275 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721; supra notes 48–89, 194–244 and accompanying text. By 
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278 See, e.g., State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (discussing the Minne-
sota Supreme Court’s exercise of its supervisory authority by holding that custodial inter-
rogations will only be admissible at trial if recorded); State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 547 (N.J. 
2004) (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s exercise of its supervisory authority 
regarding the electronic recording of confessions as a prerequisite to admissibility); State v. 
Bennett, 165 P.3d 1241, 1249 (Wash. 2007) (exercising its supervisory power to instruct 
lower Washington courts to refrain from using a particular jury instruction). Justice Ben-
jamin Cardozo, during his tenure as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, dis-
cussed the role of supervisory jurisdiction in New York courts, but was reluctant to extend 
its scope beyond “particular exigencies” in concrete situations. People ex rel. Lemon v. 
Supreme Court of N.Y., 156 N.E. 84, 86 (N.Y. 1927). Using their supervisory powers, states 
can create rules that are easy to implement at trial. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 881 A.2d at 318 (di-
recting trial courts to implement jury instructions incorporating warnings about the dan-
gers inherent in eyewitness identification); State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 
2011) (“[W]e have the inherent judicial authority to regulate and supervise the rules that 
govern the admission of evidence in the lower courts.”). 
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most cases where eyewitness identification will be used at trial.279 Addi-
tionally, states are free to experiment with different approaches to de-
termine what leads to the greatest degree of reliability.280 For example, 
if state courts apply a more rigid rule suppressing identifications pro-
cured in a suggestive manner, or adopt a more expansive test to deter-
mine reliability, law enforcement officials may adopt techniques that 
reduce suggestiveness, thereby increasing reliability.281 It might also 
spur state legislatures to enact statutes regulating police practices.282 
 If state courts are clear that they are interpreting their own consti-
tutions to grant greater due process rights regarding the ability of de-
fendants to challenge eyewitness identification testimony, the Supreme 
Court cannot review the decision.283 Moreover, the fact that states have 
granted greater protections under state constitutions than the Supreme 
Court in other areas of criminal procedure legitimates this practice in 
the context of eyewitness identification.284 
 States have granted greater individual protections under their own 
constitutions in other areas of criminal procedure where the U.S. Su-
preme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution restrictively.285 For 
                                                                                                                      
 
279 See Brennan, supra note 19, at 491; see also U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
280 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that it is “one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
state may . . . serve as a laboratory” and try novel experiments without affecting the rest of 
the country). 
281 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 912. If the identification had been suppressed in Perry, po-
lice officers in the future might have been more careful about the circumstances sur-
rounding identifications (including the lighting and the proximity of the suspect to an-
other police officer). See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721–22. The current state of the law merely 
deters police officers from actively arranging suggestive procedures; it does not encourage 
them to adopt best practices that ensure reliable identifications. See id. 
282 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 912. 
283 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983) (discussing the adequate and 
independent state ground standard for determining whether there is a federal question 
and concluding that if the state court makes a plain statement indicating it is relying on 
state law, this standard will be met); see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Consti-
tutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 625 (1981) (arguing that state courts will 
always play a role in adjudicating constitutional claims). 
284 Robert M. Bloom & Hillary Massey, Accounting for Federalism in State Courts: Exclusion 
of Evidence Obtained Lawfully by Federal Agents, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 381, 389 (2008) (citing 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (describing 
“new federalism” and noting that in some states criminal defendants enjoy greater protec-
tions than those granted under federal law). 
285 See Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and De-
mocratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 19, 27–28 (1989) 
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example, state courts have granted greater protections than the Su-
preme Court in declining to extend exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule,286 in interpreting unreasonable searches and seizures,287 and in 
formulating the correct test for determining the adequacy of warrant 
requirements.288 In addition, states have declined to adopt the Su-
preme Court’s lax standard regarding consent searches.289 Instead, 
some state courts have interpreted their constitutions to require that 
the police inform people that they have the right to refuse to consent 
to a search.290 
 Thus, because states have granted greater rights in other areas of 
criminal procedure where the Supreme Court has interpreted constitu-
tional protections narrowly, it is reasonable that states can, and should, 
implement similarly protective measures to exclude unreliable identifi-
cations.291 If contraband found during an unlawful search incident to 
                                                                                                                      
(observing a “marked increase” in state courts interpreting their constitutions independ-
ently). 
286 See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856–57 (N.J. 1987) (rejecting the Su-
preme Court’s application of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984), and concluding that the New Jersey constitution 
does not contain a good-faith exception); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126–27 (Vt. 1991) 
(declining to extend Leon’s good-faith exception under the Vermont constitution). 
287 See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58–60 (Haw. 1974) (rejecting the Supreme 
Court’s analysis on a lawful search incident to arrest in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 235 (1973), and concluding that the Hawaii constitution requires that governmental 
intrusion must not be “greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circum-
stances”); State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900, 914 (Mont. 2001) (rejecting Robinson and estab-
lishing a more stringent privacy standard under the Montana constitution than the U.S. 
Constitution); see also State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 875 (N.J. 2005) (concluding that 
the New Jersey constitution grants a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal bank 
records, contrary to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976), and Payner, 447 U.S. at 
732). 
288 See, e.g., People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 411 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting the Su-
preme Court’s totality of the circumstances test for determining adequate warrant re-
quirements articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), and concluding that 
the more protective, two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test is required by the New York constitu-
tion); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984) (same). 
289 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975) (interpreting the New Jersey 
constitution as requiring that police inform people of their right to refuse a search for 
consent to be valid); State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998) (same). 
290 Compare Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68 (holding that the police must inform persons to be 
searched about their right to refuse consent), with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 234 (1973) (holding that a valid consent to a search does not require proving knowl-
edge of the right to refusal). 
291 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Mass. 1995) (rejecting the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in its 1977 decision, Manson v. Brathwaite, and affirming the in-
terpretation of the Massachusetts constitution as requiring per se exclusion of unnecessar-
ily suggestive showups); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
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arrest is excluded under a state constitution, it seems natural that state 
courts should also exclude an identification that, if admitted, would 
undermine due process.292 
 It is important that state courts recognize the dangers of eyewitness 
misidentifications, and implement measures to ensure their judicial 
systems comport with due process.293 Although it might be difficult to 
prescribe a blanket rule excluding unreliable identifications, courts 
could set standards that more carefully evaluate identifications made 
under suggestive circumstances, thereby eliminating some of the con-
fusion surrounding the five-factor Biggers test and creating a clearer 
rule of admissibility.294 One clear way to improve the accuracy and reli-
ability of eyewitness identification testimony is for states to adopt a test 
similar to what New Jersey began implementing in 2011.295 
B. New Jersey as a Model 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court embraced the scientific research 
highlighting the dangers of eyewitness identification in its 2011 deci-
sion in State v. Henderson, and has adopted a seemingly workable and 
balanced approach to eyewitness identification.296 The Henderson court 
resolved the two problems left after Perry by eliminating the police or-
chestration requirement to raise a due process claim, and by replacing 
the Biggers factors with a more suitable, multi-factor test for reliability.297 
 The Henderson court solved the first problem by holding that the 
New Jersey Constitution requires New Jersey courts to hold preliminary 
judicial hearings (similar to Wade hearings) when a defendant presents 
some evidence of suggestiveness, state or otherwise involved in procur-
ing an identification.298 The Henderson court solved the second prob-
lem by rejecting the Manson/Biggers test, which focuses on whether an 
identification was impermissibly suggestive to lead to a misidentifica-
                                                                                                                      
292 See Kaluna, 520 P2d at 58–59; Hardaway, 36 P.3d at 914. 
293 See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 55, at 9 (calling for a reevaluation of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in the eyewitness identification context). 
294 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 55, 80–81 (2008) (criticizing the Biggers/Manson test as an inadequate tool for exclud-
ing unreliable eyewitness identifications). For example, state courts could exclude identifi-
cations made through showups or identifications made during biased lineups. See Gar-
rett, supra note 8, at 55–59 (describing the dangers of showups and stacked lineups). 
295 See infra notes 296–333 and accompanying text. 
296 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
297 See id.; supra notes 194–244 and accompanying text. 
298 See State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 942 (N.J. 2011); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919 n.10, 928. 
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tion, and by rejecting the five Biggers factors as measures of reliability.299 
In their place, the court adopted a multi-factor test that utilizes system 
and estimator variables to determine reliability.300 
                                                                                                                     
 The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to con-
duct an investigation to determine the best test to evaluate reliability, 
who concluded that three of the five Biggers reliability factors are them-
selves unreliable because they rely on self-reporting, which can be influ-
enced by suggestive procedures.301 Although having preliminary judicial 
hearings may seem cumbersome in criminal proceedings, this burden is 
outweighed by the benefit of avoiding wrongful convictions.302 
 The court was conscious of the state’s interest in protecting public 
safety, and thus did not adopt a per se rule of exclusion.303 The court 
recognized that an identification would likely not be found inadmissi-
ble at a pretrial hearing based solely on estimator variables (i.e., vari-
ables not influenced by the criminal justice system).304 The court’s ac-
knowledgment that both system and estimator variables should play a 
significant role in the admissibility analysis strikes a good balance be-
tween ensuring justice and maintaining the use of eyewitness identifica-
tion as an important prosecutorial tool.305 
 Therefore, other states should adopt New Jersey’s framework be-
cause it goes further than the U.S. Supreme Court by taking into ac-
count any type of suggestiveness.306 The framework also does a good 
job translating modern scientific developments highlighting the unre-
liability of eyewitness identifications into a set of factors that courts can 
apply.307 New Jersey’s standard includes estimator variables such as ra-
cial bias, stress, and the presence of a weapon, and system variables, in-
cluding sequential versus simultaneous lineups, showups, and lineup 
procedures.308 Judges then weigh these factors during a pretrial hear-
 
 
299 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918; supra notes 226–244 and accompanying text. 
300 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–22. 
301 See id. at 918 (finding that the level of certainty of the witness at the time of the 
identification and the witness’s self-reports of the witness’s degree of attention and oppor-
tunity to view the suspect at the time of the crime have been proven to be inaccurate 
measures of reliability). 
302 See id. at 928. 
303 See id. at 922. 
304 See id. at 923. 
305 See id. at 928. 
306 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
307 See id. 
308 See id. at 920–21. The system variables that New Jersey courts will now use are blind 
administration, pre-identification instructions, lineup construction, feedback, recording 
confidence, multiple viewings, showups, private actors, and other identifications made. Id. 
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ing.309 Although judges retain a significant amount of discretion in 
weighing the factors, these factors are straightforward and easy to ap-
ply.310 And the defendant still bears the burden of proving a substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification, ensuring that not all identi-
fications will be excluded under the New Jersey model.311 
 Had Perry been decided in New Jersey, the outcome may have been 
different.312 The trial court would have looked at the suggestiveness of 
the identification despite the lack of overt police-orchestrated sugges-
tiveness.313 The trial court, once suggestiveness was adequately alleged, 
would then weigh the estimator and system variables.314 In Perry, the 
time of day (three o’clock in the morning) and the vantage point of 
the witness (a window on the fourth floor of an apartment building) 
would be included in the court’s analysis of reliability.315 The darkness 
and the witness’s distance from the suspect cast doubt on the reliability 
of this identification.316 In addition, the court could take into account 
the subsequent failure of the witness to identify the defendant in a 
photo array.317 In weighing all of the relevant factors, a judge might still 
have decided that the identification was reliable and therefore admissi-
ble.318 Whatever the end result, utilizing the multi-factor approach will 
help to ensure a just outcome.319 
 It may be too soon to know if New Jersey’s procedures will cure all 
of the inherent problems associated with eyewitness identification.320 
                                                                                                                      
The estimator variables that the court incorporated into its test are stress, weapon focus, 
duration, distance and lighting, witness characteristics, characteristics of the perpetrator, 
memory decay, race-bias, opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, degree 
of attention, accuracy of the prior description of the criminal, level of certainty demon-
strated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 
920–22. 
309 See id. at 920. Although there are many factors to weigh, all of the factors will not be 
present in every challenged identification. See id. at 922. Moreover, judges often perform 
balancing tests. See id. at 920. The alternative is not including a potentially determinative 
factor in the test, which threatens the fairness of the proceeding. See id. 
310 Id. at 920–21. This is especially true of some of the estimator variables, such as light, 
distance, and cross-racial identifications. See id.; supra notes 315–316 and accompanying 
text. 
311 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920. 
312 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
313 See Chen, 27 A.3d at 942. 
314 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920. 
315 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 
316 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921. 
317 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22. 
318 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–22. 
319 See id. 
320 See id. 
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Nevertheless, for now the New Jersey approach seems to be the best 
option for state courts to implement because it appears to be both 
workable and fair.321 Moreover, state courts can experiment with this 
model or adopt their own standards that at least take some of the scien-
tific data into account.322 
 Other options states can adopt include a hybrid Henderson/Perry 
formula, the current Perry framework, or a mix of the Henderson factors 
and other measures.323 For instance, a hybrid Henderson/Perry formula 
would keep intact Perry’s holding that the court will not conduct a reli-
ability hearing if there is no police misconduct leading to suggestive-
ness, but it would eliminate the Biggers factors and instead adopt Hen-
derson’s system and estimator variables to determine reliability when 
police suggestiveness is involved.324 This would lead to greater reliabil-
ity when police misconduct is involved, but would still not account for 
suggestive identifications without police misconduct.325 
 A second option is for states to maintain the Perry framework and 
wait for the Supreme Court to revisit its jurisprudence.326 In the mean-
time, courts would only make reliability determinations when police 
misconduct was involved and courts would continue to use the anti-
quated Biggers factors.327 This approach would effectively maintain the 
status quo, which has resulted in an unacceptable number of wrongful 
convictions.328 
 A third option would be to combine either some or all of the Hen-
derson analysis with improved jury instructions that fully explain the 
dangers associated with eyewitness identification and/or more expan-
sive use of expert testimony outlining the dangers of eyewitness identi-
fication.329 This combination of using estimator and system variables to 
determine reliability (in all cases where there is any type of suggestive-
ness), and instituting innovative trial tools would likely lead to greater 
reliability and fewer wrongful convictions.330 
                                                                                                                      
321 See id. 
322 See id.; People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981) (experimenting with 
the admissibility of showups); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (experi-
menting with changing the Biggers factors). 
323 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
324 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
325 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
326 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. A reconsideration of Perry, however, seems unlikely in 
the near future given the near unanimity of the opinion. See id. 
327 See id. 
328 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
329 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–22; supra notes 151–155 and accompanying text. 
330 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–22. 
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 If state courts choose experimentation over idleness and stagna-
tion, criminal proceedings will be fairer and states can try different ap-
proaches.331 The Henderson model is comprehensive and ready to be 
implemented.332 Because the Henderson model encompasses modern 
research, establishes concrete factors that judges can use to determine 
reliability, and considers suggestiveness even when not the result of po-
lice misconduct, states should adopt this model to ensure fundamental 
fairness in criminal proceedings.333 
Conclusion 
 Eyewitness identifications are an important law enforcement tool 
that can lead to just convictions that promote public safety. In some 
situations, they may be the only way to make a case against a perpetra-
tor. Nonetheless, eyewitness identifications often have proved to be un-
reliable. Human memory is malleable; we are often unable to remem-
ber a face, or we can easily misremember a face. This is not to say that 
eyewitness identification should never be used. The Supreme Court’s 
current jurisprudence, however, fails to adequately take these factors 
into account. 
 Although the Supreme Court limited the scope of due process in 
Perry v. New Hampshire, state courts can and should revise the factors they 
use to determine whether a due process violation occurred. State courts, 
where the majority of criminal trials are heard, should grant greater 
protections to ensure that defendants have adequate access to due 
process of law, a fundamental safeguard in the American legal system. 
With years of research and scientific data indicating that human mem-
ory is not as reliable as we would like it to be, there does not seem to be 
another alternative to wrongful convictions. Ronald Cotton spent over 
4000 days in prison for a crime he did not commit. State courts need to 
set up systems to ensure that no one in the future suffers such injustice. 
 
 
331 See id. at 928 (“At the core of our system of criminal justice is the ‘twofold aim . . . 
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.’” (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935))). 
332 See id. at 920–22. 
333 See id. 
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